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THE MATTER OF CONTINUANCES
INTRODUCTION
A continuance is a postponement of a cause, and in particular, a
grant of delay in the hearing of a cause to a future time in the same or
a later term. There are two broad classifications of continuances, those
granted by law and those authorized by court order. The former class
includes those cases remaining undisposed of at the end of a term for
which no court order for a continuance to the next term of court is neces-
sary. The latter class of continuance falls in one of three categories: (1)
those sanctioned by the court upon application by both parties to a
cause, (2) those granted by a court on its own motion, and (3) those
granted for cause upon application by one of the parties, and with or
without objection iby the other party. The last named category is the
concern and scope limit of this article since it is in this field of the
subject that most contested grounds arise.
It is a well settled point of law that the power of a court to refuse
or grant a continuance upon application of one of the parties is an
inherent discretionary power independent of statute, and incident to the
court's power to -hear and determine causes.1 In conjunction with this
settled rule it is quite uniformly held that a continuance properly re-
quested, where the ends of justice require it, cannot be refused. On the
other hand, it is also uniformly held that an abuse of discretion in grant-
ing or denying a continuance is grounds for reversal.
Broad policy principles intervene to assist -the court in the exercise
of its discretion in certain types of cases. The rules evolved to govern
the granting of continuances in civil and criminal cases are generally
the same. However, the delay of a criminal case will occasion closer
scrutiny of the asserted grounds by the court because of the stronger
motive ordinarily existing to induce a defendant to seek delay. On the
other hand, a continuance of a divorce proceeding is more liberally viewed
by the court due to the strong public and state interest in the matter,
especially where children are involved. Continuances within term are
more likely to be granted than continuances requested which will carry
over to another term of court. A request for an additional continuance
is not favorably viewed except under such circumstances that refusal to
continue would thwart justice.
STATUTORY CONTROL OF CONTINUANCES IN OHIO
Although there are a few statutes in Ohio dealing with the subject
of continuances, it is well settled law in Ohio, as elsewhere, that the
power of courts to grant continuances in the exercise of sound discretion
is independent of statute. Probably the leading Ohio case is State ex rel
Buck v. McCabe,' in which the common pleas court of Lucas County on
1 Norton v. Norton, III Ohio St. 262, 266, 145 N. E. 253 (1924); Frohwerk
v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, (1919).
2 140 Ohio St. 535, 45 N. E. 2d 763 (1942).
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the motion of defendant's counsel continued an action for damages arising
out of an automobile striking the plaintiff pedestrian. The continuance
was for the duration of the war. The defendant, a minor at the time of
the accident, enlisted in the Canadian military service prior to the time
the action was brought, and service was made upon his mother per-
sonally. Answer was made by the mother and motion to continue was
made before the date set for hearing. The motion was sustained. The
Court of Appeals refused plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus,
and the Supreme Court held that this refusal was not error.
The code provisions regulating continuances in Ohio seem to
recognize the inherent power of the courts in this field.' While there does
appear to be some statutory control of the courts' power to grant continu-
ances, and while courts have adopted some rules covering the subject, by
and large the statutory and rule directives are sparse and tend to conform
generally with practices which grew independent of legislation. The dearth
of legislation on the subject indicates the difficulty of codifying to any
great degree the multitude of grounds and circumstances which may at
any given time allegedly exist to support the grant of a continuance. Only
one statute exists in Ohio which controls the court's exercise of discretion
in granting a continuance. 4 This section provides that in an action for
recovery of money an offer to confess judgment is not grounds for
continuance or postponement of the trial. The reason for this is obvious
and the statutory admonition is believed unnecessary since it is apparent
that a court would not grant a continuance in such circumstances in any
event. Other statutes, while mentioning a possible ground for con-
tinuance, leave the decision to the courts in the final analysis by using
such language as, "the court may for good cause shown", or "when
the court is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise the court may" etc.' While
the exercise of the court's discretion is possibly liberalized by this type
of statute, there is no law on the subject until the grounds are passed on
by the court.
COURT RULES IN OHIO
The rules of practice in the Ohio Courts furnish some guidance
for the judges in exercising their discretion, though the only rules adopted
to date deal with the single situation where continuances are requested
on the ground that testimony of an absent witness is needed. The rules
are as follows:
Rule XXV of the Supreme Court of Ohio.-In all applications
for the continuance of a cause in the Court of Appeals, and for
a second continuance in the Court of Common Pleas, on the
ground of inability to procure the testimony of an absent wit-
3 See Ohio Rev. Code §§1911.73, 1911.74 (continuances in justice court);
2305.02, 2309.61 (continuances in common pleas court).
t Ohio Rev. Code §2311.19.
UFor examples of this type of statute see Ohio Rev. Code §§2309.61, 2725.16.
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ness, the party making the application shall state in his affidavit
what he expects to prove by such witness, and also what acts of
of diligence he has employed to procure the testimony of such
witness, and if the court finds the testimony material, and that
due diligence has been used, said cause may be continued, unless
the opposite party consents to the reading of such affidavit in
evidence; in which case the trial may proceed, and said affidavit
be read on the trial, and treated as a deposition of an absent
witness.
First applications for continuance in the Common Pleas Court
shall be subject to such regulations as that court shall adopt.
Rule II of the Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals.-
In all applications for the continuance of a cause in the Court
of Appeals on the ground of inability to procure the testimony
of an absent witness, the party making the application shall state
in his affidavit what he expects to prove by such witness,
and also what acts of diligence he has employed to procure
the testimony of such witness, and if the court finds the testi-
mony material, and that due diligence has been used, said
cause may be continued, unless the opposite party consents
to the reading of such affidavit in evidence, in which case the
trial may proceed and said affidavit be read on the trial, and
treated as the disposition of an absent witness.
Rule of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.-
An application for the continuance of a cause shell be by
motion supported by affidavit, and if the continuance is asked
for on the ground of inability to procure the testimony of
an absent witness etc., (see above rules) emphasis added.)
STATUTORY AND RULES CONTROL IN FEDERAL COURTS
Basically, the Supreme Court of the United States under its statu-
tory rule making power controls the motions practice of the federal
courts.6 In actual practice in federal courts there appears to be a re-
luctance to grant continuances. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide for a continuance to enable the party objecting to certain evidence to
meet the same.' Federal rule 56 (f) makes continuance allowable on
proper objection to a motion for summary judgment a matter of dis-
cretion. But the matter of continuances in federal courts is regulated
by the rules and practices of the individual courts. Consequently, when
a continuance is to be sought, care should be taken to comply with the
local procedure relative thereto, with such specifications of reason there-
for, and such supporting affidavits and exhibits as may be called for.'
All federal case rulings examined on the point simply state that con-
tinuances are discretionary with the courts and reversible only where the
appellate court finds -that the trial court abused its discretion.
Perhaps the most frequently cited ground for a continuance is the
628 U.S.C.A. 2072 (1948).
7Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and compare Ohio Rev. Code §2309.61.8 SULLIVAN: A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF .CIVIL PROCEDURE (1949).
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absence of a witness or the testimony the missing witness would offer.
There is a substantial uniformity in all courts in the prerequisites of an
affidavit submitted in support of a motion to continue the cause on this
ground. Further, these prerequisites are deemed essential to a continuance
sought on other grounds i.e., absent counsel, absent party and others. It is
proper, then, to start with a consideration of these factors.
MATERIALYrry
The testimony of the missing witness, or the missing evidence must
be material to the issues in the case. This means that the evidence must
be germane to the ultimate issues of fact. Thus the District Court,
Southern Dist. of Fla. was upheld by the circuit court of appeals in
City of Coral Gables v. Hayes,' when.it denied a continuance sought
because defendant had been unable to procure attendance of witnesses
where only one witness was alleged to exist, and his testimony if given
would have been immaterial to the issues. In Ohio it has been held that a
continuance is properly denied where the only effect of the testimony of
the absent witness would be to impeach the credibility of some witness
offered by the opposing party."0 A Mississippi holding is illustrative of the
necessity for materiality being alleged in submitting a motion for con-
tinuance. The Supreme Court of Mississippi said:
There was no error in the action of the (trial) court in re-
fusing appellants application, to either continue the case or
delay its trial to another day on account of the absence of the
witness Dennis, by whom he expected to prove that the deceased
stated to the witness that the reason that he did not shoot the
appellant at the time of the difficulty was that his gun was not
loaded. In the application for a continuance or delay of the
trial, in order to procure the presence of this witness, it was not
set out when the deceased said he would have shot the appellant
had his gun been loaded, whether before appellant shot him or
afterward. As a justification of the homicide the appellant relied
on self-defense. He testified that he shot the deceased in order
to prevent the latter from taking his life or doing him some
great bodily harm; that at the time he shot deceased the latter
had his gun trying to shoot appellant. It was most pertinent
therefore as to whether deceased meant in his statement to the
witness that he would have shot appellant as aggressor or in
self-defense. We hold that what appellant desired to prove by
the deceased, entirely consistent with the evidence for the
state, which showed that the appellant was the agressor in the
difficulty, and not the deceased.1 '
In another Mississippi case the appellant had moved in trial court for
a continuance on the following ground:
That said Mrs. Carrie Weir's testimony is material, in that she
974 F. 2d 989 (1935).
10 Cohen v. Rudnicka, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 13 (1929).
11 Woulard v. State, 137 Miss. 808, 102 So. 781 (1925).
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has lived with the defendant continuously day and night since
March 16, 1921, and for years prior thereto. That next to him-
self, Mrs. Weir knows the whereabouts of the defendant day
and night better than any other living person, and is more
qualified as to his whereabouts than any other person. That the
defendant can prove his continuous whereabouts better by said
Mrs. Carrie Weir than any other person. That she occupies the
same room and bed with the defendant at night and that he can
prove these facts by no other witness. That without said witness
he cannot safely go to trial at this term of court.
The appellate court ruled as follows:
In our opinion the application for a continuance was properly
overruled, because the application itself does not show that
Mrs. Weir would testify that appellant was not guilty, and it
specifies no time or place at which she would place the defendant
at the time of the offense. It does not appear from the applica-
tion that she would testify contradictory to the state's witnesses.'
DILIGENCE
It is definitely established, both at common law and under all
statutes and court rules that a motion for a continuance must be sup-
ported by a full and complete disclosure of the diligence exerted by the
movant to secure the absent testimony or evidence. The diligence must
be shown to have been exercised not only prior to having made the
motion except in the case of surprise or.other excuse, but also in reason-
ably sufficient time before the trial to have abtained the attendance of the
absent witness or to have procured the missing evidence. It has even been
held in federal court that proof of due diligence to procure the attendance
of testimony of an absent witness and of facts presenting reasonable
grounds to believe that this evidence will be secured at the next term of
court is essential to a right to continuance or to an admission of the state-
ment of the witness' testimony as evidence."3 In Ohio it has been held
that a refusal to grant continuance on a showing that material witness
was in the armed forces and unable to be present at the trial for the
reason that the moving party had adequate time after the case was assigned
to arrange for the taking of the deposition of the witness was not an
abuse of discretion by the trial court.14 The failure of the evidence
offered to show that the missing witness had received a subpoena was
given in an Ohio appellate court case as good reason for refusing a
continuance. 5 While the same objection would be voiced by a federal
court under the same circumstances, it is indicative of the impossibility of
formulating hard and fast rules, such as a showing of having reached
the witness with service, that there are cases in which the showing of
12 Ware v. State, 133 Miss. 837, 98 So. 229 (1903).
13 Armour v. Kollmeyer, 161 F. 78 (1908).
14 Reitnour v. McClain, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 185, 57 N.E. 2d 78 (1943).
15 Watson v. Stack, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 343 (1931).
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service was held not to be necessary to support a continuance. In an early
federal case it was stated by the defendant that he had employed a proc-
ess server and had asked the defendant's brother to take certain steps
to secure service. The witness was alleged to be material and the de-
fendant did not feel he could go to trial without the missing testimony.
No service was had and the plaintiff's attorney argued that proof of
service was necessary to a grant of continuance. The court held that
the process server had not been heard from and may have met with an
accident, and that under those circumstances a continuance would be
granted."6 Again, in the case of White v. Lynch," it was held that the
fact that an attorney, who was a material witness and who had pro-
mised to be present, did not attend was ground for a continuance, even
though he was not subpoenaed.'" See Okey v. Webber, for an example
of "reasonable" diligence sufficient to secure a reversal of a common
pleas court's refusal to continue the action where the defendant could not
locate a material witness and therefore could not secure service.
The diligence of an applicant to secure an absent witness where the
witness is an employee of the applicant has received special treatment by
the courts, sometimes working without benefit of statutory assistance
and in other cases viewing a statutory requirement of diligence to mean
that employer applicants have added responsibility where their employees
are to testify. The requirement as to employer applicants for continuances
seems to be advisable in order to eliminate the possibility of connivance
between the employer and employee to postpone the trial.' 9
CUMULATIVE NATURE OF THE ABSENT TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE
Since it would be improper to delay a trial unnecessarily, the party
applying for a continuance on the ground of the absence of a material
witness must ordinarily show that there are no other witnesses by whom he
can establish the same facts. If no such showing is made, or if it appears
that substantially the same testimony as that which is absent is offered at
the trial, a continuance will ordinarily be refused. What is or is not
cumulative evidence as regards the granting of a continuance should be
distinguished from the ordinary concept of cumulative evidence defined in
cases relating to new trials for newly discovered evidence where the
rule against granting new trials for the production of merely cumulative
evidence is usually strictly enforced. In considering requests for new
trial the courts seem to hold that cumulative evidence is evidence of the
lGPennington v. Scott, 2 U. S. (2 DalI.) 94, (1786).
172 U. S. (2 Dall.) 183, (1787).
18 Okey v. Webber, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 588 (1932).
19 See Alaska Anthracite R. Co. v. Moller, 257 F. 511 (1919) ; Stedman v.
Hamilton, 4 McLean, Ind. (1849); Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Rountree, 292 Ky.
59, 165 S. W. 2d 973 (1942). In the latter case an insurance company had been
notified of a policy holder's contentions five months before the pertinent adjuster
employee had gone into military service yet failed to do anything about it. A
continuance on the ground of the adjuster's absence was denied.
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same kind as that already given on the same point. Evidence of any dis-
puted fact having been offered by showing particular circumstances, any
evidence which only shows the same circumstances is purely cumulative.
Evidence which would tend to establish the disputed fact by other
circumstances is not cumulative but corroborative. The extent of the
rule excluding cumulative evidence as a ground for continuance seems
to be carefully limited to those cases wherein the facts about which the
absent witness would testify are established on the trial by other witnesses
or from other sources, without substantial conflict or dispute or where
the court may say with confidence that the applicant has not been
harmed by a denial of the application for delay upon a review of the
complete record. The line between the two types of cases is a fine one
and seems to result in the simple conclusion that a request for a new trial
will be granted only for compelling reasons while an application for a
continuance does not put the court to a post-trial but a pre-trial considera-
tion of what may be prejudicial to the applicant. The problem does not
occasion too much difficulty in the usual case in Ohio since the court rules,
supra, permit the introduction of the missing evidence as on a deposition.
But, it is probably true that even on the acceptance of the affidavit con-
cerning absent testimony, even if cumulative in effect, there may be
prejudice to the applicant for a continuance since the probable weight of
the personal testimony with the jury may or may not be a proper sub-
ject of inquiry for the court. If the absent witness is a person of high
reputation in the community the weight of his oral testimony at the trial
might possibly override any objection to its cumulative nature or even
the fact that the adverse party would admit that the absent witness would
so testify.
The Ohio cases that have dealt with this sub-topic are Cohen v.
Rudnicka,2 in which a continuance was denied for the purpose of obtain-
ing an impeaching witness, and Coppock v. Horine,2 1 in which a con-
tinuance to permit the presence of an expert witness was held properly
denied where it did not appear that the expert would testify to anything
not covered by medical testimony already profferred and accepted on
behalf of the movant. Another, and probably the leading, Ohio case
ruling on the subject is Kroger Adm'r. v. Ryan.2" The Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court and affirmed the judgment of the common
pleas court on its finding that the defendant's motion for a continuance
would be denied where, in the trial court's opinion, proper diligence had
not been shown. The question of cumulative evidence was also raised and
the syllabus note reads as follows:
1. Cumulative evidence is additional evidence of the same
kind to the same point. Therefore, where evidence offered on
20 Supra, note 10.
2132 Ohio L. Abs. 109 (1940).
22 83 Ohio St. 299, 98 N. E. 428 (1911).
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a motion for a new trial is merely cumulative upon the same
point upon which evidence was given by the party at the trial,
such evidence will be rejected as cumulative. But, where the
evidence thus offered is respecting a new and distinct fact,
although it tends to establish the same general result sought
to be established by evidence given at the trial, such new evi-
dence is not cumulative and, if otherwise competent, will be
received.
Vhile there are no reported federal cases the following state cases
will serve to illustrate the general view. In Wheeler Stave Co. v.
Wrght,2 3 a motion for continuance based upon the absence of five
witnesses, where diligence was conceded, was denied where it was alleged
they were present at the time of the alleged incident and could have
seen it had it occurred and that they would have testified that it did
not occur. The ground for denial was simply that others present had
already so testified and further testimony on the point was unnecessary.
In Thompson v. Harrelson24 a plaintiff was denied a continuance on
the ground that two witnesses were absent when he told the judge
that he could swear to the same facts that he wished to prove by the
missing witnesses. The missing witnesses were his sister-in-law and his
son-in-law.2
5
PROBABILITY OF PRODUCING THE ABSENT WITNESS OR EVIDENCE
It is stated that as a general rule a continuance will not be granted
unless it is shown that the testimony of the witness whose presence is
desired can in all probability be secured at a future time. The only re-
ported Ohio case raising this question follows this general rule.26
That case held that where a notary taking a witness' deposition
in another county sustained the witness' refusal to testify and the relator's
counsel had selected the notary and there was no assurance that another
attempt would not end in the same manner, thus indefinitely post-
poning the action, a continuance motion was properly denied. Numerous
decisions of other jurisdictions support the general rule. In a Montana
case, 27 citing Oklahoma, California and Illinois decisions, the court
stated that it is incumbent upon one seeking a continuance by reason of
the absence of a witness that he must show that the witness can be pro-
23194 Ark. 115, 106 S. W. 2d 191 (1937).
24192 Ga. 419, 15 S. E. 2d 497 (1941).
25 See also: City of N. Y. Ins. Co. v. Greene, 183 Va. 35, 31 S. E. 2d 268
(1944); Silfast v. Matheny, 171 Or. 1, 136 P. 2d 260 (1943); Ohern v. Hatter,
189 Oki. 663, 119 P. 2d 48 (1941). But see, VonRaitz v. Ankers, 173 N. Y. S.
411 (1919), where defendant was denied a postponement when he set up the
absence of his mother, whom he deposed was present when the agreement con-
stituting the defense was made, held, that a denial of continuance could not be
sustained on the ground that the mother's testimony would only have been cumu-
lative of that of the defendants.
26 State ex rel. Dolle v. Miller, 18 0. Dec. 218, 5 OLR 260 (1907).
27O'Neill v. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 P. 2d 672, 674 (1937).
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duced at a later date. The case is rather strong authority since the missing
witness was the defendant. Indiana, it appears, makes it a statutory re-
quirement that the affidavit of the movant for a continuance show the
probability that the absent witness will attend within a reasonable time.28
Although there are other considerations weighed by the courts in
determining whether a continuance will be granted in the case of absent
witnesses or evidence it is submitted that the above tests constitute the
prime determinants employed by the courts in exercising their discretion
in the matter. These or other analagous considerations are also used by
the courts to weigh the right to a continuance based on grounds other
than absence of witnesses or missing evidence.
Probably the second most frequently used ground for requesting
a continuance is the argument of surprise. This ground ordinarily arises
from two sources. First, the amendment of a pleading by the adverse
party immediately before or during the trial, and, secondly, where a wit-
ness for the examining party testifies contrary to expectation.
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
This ground for continuance is recognized by Ohio Rev. Code
§2309.61. In accord with the general rule under common law it is to
be noted that although the statute furnishes a ground for continuance
the grant of the continuance is still discretionary with the court. The
tenor of the law on this point seems to be that where a continuance is
asked on this ground the applicant must show how he is prejudiced by the
amendment, the rule being that an amendment made before or during
trial which does not affect the merits nor in reality surprise the adverse
party is not ground for a continuance. -2 9
In the federal courts the practice of allowing continuances after
amendment of pleadings by the adverse party is recognized as being within
the courts power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (a). The
consideration of the real effect of the amendment is looked at as it is in
state courts.
80
29 Indiana Quarries v. Lavender, 64 Ind. App. 415, 114 N. E. 417 (1916).
29 For Ohio rulings holding the amendments material and therefore good
grounds see, Dye v. Luck, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 439 (1938); Laws v. Morely, 27 Ohio
C.C. Dec. 209, Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 103 (1915). For Ohio cases holding the amend-
ments not material and therefore not good grounds see Industrial Comm. of
Ohio v. Cleek, 13 Ohio App. 417, 32 Ohio Ct. App. 23 (1920); Cinn. Traction
Co. v. George, 22 Ohio C.C. Dec. 403, 3 Ohio C.C.R. 209 (1910), aff'd. 86 Ohio
St. 339 (1912). Thus, if an amendment at the trial changes the form of the action
or sets up a new and different cause of action the opposite party is usually entitled
to a continuance. But, if the facts on which such a defense is based are necessarily
involved in the defenses originally pleaded the amendment will not be deemed
to work a surprise.
90 See the following federal cases denying a continuance on amendment
by the adverse party: George v. Wiseman, 98 F. 2d 923 (1938); Federal Life
Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F. 2d 693 (1923), cert. den. (47 S. Ct. 112) (273 U. S. 722)
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SURPRIsE TEsrIMoNy
Suprise by reason of unexpected testimony of a party's witness during
the trial may be good ground for continuance, when it appears that proper
preparation of the case to avoid surprise was made and available means to
overcome the effect of the surprise were used. The Ohio position is in
accord with the authorities as it is in all matters affecting continuances.
In Kroger dnzr v. Ryan,31 the court was faced with a request for a
continuance because the movant's witness allegedly surprised the movant
by stating that certain evidence was not known to him of his own knowl-
edge. The movant argued that he thought, under the circumstances of
the case, that the witness, a doctor, knew of the evidence first hand,
and that the movant had not been previously advised that the witness
did not have first hand knowledge. The court held that a normal amount
of diligence would have uncovered this fact and that a continuance could
not be granted for such reason. Conclusive as this holding appears to be
it should be noted that the motion was first made in connection with a
motion for new trial and not at the time of the alleged surprise testi-
mony. There is language by the court which indicates that the motion
might haie been sustained if requested at the proper time, notwithstanding
the lack of diligence. The case is cited with approval in Gichanov et al.
v. Unitd States."
ABSENCE OF COUNSEL OR PARTY
Another frequently argued ground for continuance is the absence of
counsel or party. Whether or not a continuance should be granted because
of the absence, from illness, death, or other cause, of applicant's counsel
must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
mere unexplained absence of counsel, or without sufficient reason being
given therefore, is not ground for continuance. If a party is or can be
adequately represented by other counsel the motion will be denied, and
where it is claimed that substituted counsel is not sufficiently informed,
proper and diligent efforts to have obtained the necessary information
must be shown. Mere pressure of other business by which counsel is
detained is generally held not sufficient ground for a continuance, par-
ticularly where it is not shown that other professional advice is unavail-
able. Counsel's absence because of his attendance on the legislature as a
member thereof does not seem to be a sufficient ground for a continuance
except where in some states it is so provided by statute. But even in such
jurisdictions it must be shown that counsel was retained prior to com-
mencement of the session. In determining whether a continuance should
be granted because of a counsel's illness the courts seem receptive if the
motion is made at the first term after issue is joined, rather than when
(1948). For a federal holding of an amendment by the adverse party to be good
ground for a continuance see, Strong v. Dist. of Col., 10 D. C. 499 (1877).
31Supra, note 22.
32281 F. 125 (1922).
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the action has been pending for sometime and the illness is of long
standing. The illness of a member of counsel's family has been- accepted
as valid grounds for a continuance.
In the Ohio case of Zander v. FanshaW,8 3 it was held that a con-
tinuance was properly denied in order that defendant might employ
counsel where it appeared that counsel was present although not a per-
son satisfactory to the defendant. The absence of chief counsel was held
not to be sufficient grounds for continuance in Homan v. Lightner.4 But,
the sickness of the principal counsel of defendant, the other not being
prepared, was held good ground for continuance at cost of defendant in
Shultz v. Moore. 5 In a federal case the refusal of a continuance for
one month on the ground of illness of defendant's attorney was held
improper where the defendant's attorney had pursued the case with
diligence to its close. 6 In a case between two states a continuance was
granted on account of the absence of senior counsel of one party by
reason of unexpected and severe illness.3 ' A refusal of further con-
tinuance because of absence of defendant's counsel was held not an
abuse of discretion."8 In Coper River Mining Co. v. McClelland,3 9 the
inability of the two principal counsels of corporate appellant to attend
the trial was held not to be sufficient ground for a continuance. In the
Ohio case of Scheu v. Scheul4 0 the lack of a proper showing of reason
for absence of counsel appears to have lost the motion. The appellate
court made the following remarks:
It is claimed that the court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a continuance of the cause when (Fricke) chief counsel of
appellants could not be present at the trial at the time it was
tried. It is also asserted that Logan W. Marshall of counsel
was ill during the trial of the cause. There is not sufficient
showing of any abuse of discretion on the part of the court
in requiring counsel to proceed with the trial in the absence
of Fricke, who no doubt had ample notice of the date fixed
for the trial, and it does appear that he was physically unable
to be present. Manifestly, courts may not cease to function
because one of counsel, even though chief counsel, as sug-
gested, chooses to remain away from the place of the trial
at the time set for the hearing. The physical condition of Mar-
shall was not brought to the attention of the trial judge and
he therefore was not given an opportunity to act in the situation
presented.
3329 Ohio App. 259, 162 N. E. 745 (1928).
3428 Ohio I. Abs. 78 (1935).
351 McLean 334, 7 O.F. Dec. 714 (1838).
36 Goodyear Service v. Pretzfelder, 84 F. 2d 242 (1936).
37 State of Rhode Island v. State of Mass., 36 U. S. 226, (1837).
38 Spees Sand and Clay Works v. American Trust Co. of N. Y., 286 U. S.
548, (1931).
89 138 F. 333 (1905), cert. den. 200 U. S. 616 (1905).
4033 Ohio Op. 343, 64 N. E. 2d 334 (1945).
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The absence of a party on whose behalf a continuance is asked
may be good ground, but a stricter showing of good cause seems to be
required in such cases than in those cases where it is asked on the ground
of absence of a mere witness. A complainant is not entitled to a continu-
ance because of the absence of the defendant, since if he expects to make
the latter a witness he should take the proper steps to procure his testimony.
The illness of a party where his presence is deemed necessary seems to be
sufficient ground for a continuance, providing there is hope for an early
recovery. In a criminal prosecution any illness of the defendant which
would tend to hamper the defense counsel is good reason for a con-
tinuance. A defendant is not entitled to a continuance as a matter of
course because of the plaintiff's death. A court may or may not grant a
continuance because one of the parties is absent in the military service. In
the latter type of absence the courts usually try to protect the absent
service man, but where the action affects public welfare, policy or other
broad issues the absent service man is not allowed to delay the grinding
out of the most good for the greatest number of people.
The Ohio case of State ex rel. McCabe v. Buck,41 holds that to
constitute a sufficient ground for continuance because of the absence
of a party it must appear that the absence is unavoidable, and not volun-
tary; that his presence at the trial is necessary; that the application is
made in good faith; and that he will be able to attend court at some
reasonable future time. The same court also took the view that to
authorize a continuance on the ground of the enforced absence of a
party, "it must be made to appear that he is a competent and material
witness". As to illness of a party, Welliver v. Welliver," holds that,(generally the enforced absence of a defendant because of sickness is
ground for continuance, if application is made in time". The court how-
ever found that the application had not been made in good faith. In
Allaman v. Slothower,43 the court held:
The seventh assignment of error is that the defendant was
deprived of his day in court by a surprise move. The cause came
on for trial. Counsel for defendant protested that he was not
ready to proceed. Plaintiff offered testimony to the effect that
defendant's counsel had been notified of the date of the hearing
four days before said date. Although there was some discussion
respecting this matter no evidence was forthcoming to dispute
the proof. The trial judge required the defendant's counsel to
proceed and this was done in the absence of defendant. The
action of the trial judge was clearly within his discretion. The
trial began about 2 P.M. and continued until a few minutes
after 4 P.M., at which time plaintiff rested. Defendant's
counsel then requested opportunity to call his client. This was
41140 Ohio St. 535, 45 N.E. 2d 763 (1943).
42 32 Ohio L. Abs. 172 (1940).
43 60 Ohio L. Abs. 145 (1950).
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denied and the trial judge immediately announced his finding.
The appropriateness of this action is not so plain. Manifestly,
had the defendant been present in court the trial would not
have proceeded until the next morning. It would have been ap-
propriate to say to counsel that if the defendant were in court
the following day he would be permitted to make his de-
fense. However, the prejudice to the defendant by the action
of the court does not appear because there is no statement of
affidavit in the record that he would have taken advantage of
the opportunity to appear had it been accorded to him.
In Short v. Beoddy,44 it was held that notwithstanding allegations
by plaintiff's counsel that he had made repeated unsuccessful attempts to
contact plaintiff a denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion.
It was held in Jones v. Little,45 that it is not a sufficient ground for con-
tinuance that defendant was not a witness. But in Harragh v. Morgan-
thau,46 it was held error to deny a continuance because of plaintiff's illness
where plaintiff, who was his only witness, was so ill that appearance
in court would probably have resulted in his death. Further, in Smith
v. Daniel,4 7 the alleged physical inability of the appellant to proceed to
trial was not suficient grounds to reverse the trial court's ruling that no
continuance would be allowed by reason of such allegations. Another
old federal case, Respublica v. Matlack," holds that a cause will be
continued where the defendant is absent in the plaintiff's service.
MISCELLANEOUS GROUNDS FOR CONTINUANCE
The multitude of grounds which may exist for arguing for a con-
tinuance in a particular case leave much to the initiative of counsel. The
cases are too few and the holdings too narrow to formulate any meaning-
ful rules. Thus all that can be done is refer the reader to the cases for
whatever value they may have.4 9
4463 Ohio L. Abs. 603 110 N. E. 2d 488 (1951).
452 U. S. (2 Dall.) 182, (1792).
46 89 F. 2d 863 (1937).
4746 F. 2d 740 (1931), cert. den. 283 U. S. 852 (1931).
48 2 U. S. (2 Dall.) 108 (1790).
49 Mengert v. News Printing Co., 6 Ohio N. P. n.s. 572 (1905), held that
a party to a pending action assailed by a publication by a party outside the
record, against which the party assailed is entirely helpless to protect himself in
the pending action, has good ground for the continuance of the action. In Wash-
ington v. Cincinnati, 25 Ohio L. Rep. 65 (1926), it was held that where the
defendant was placed on trial ten minutes after filing of the affidavit charg-
ing unlawful possession of liquor, and he asked for a continuance, refusal is an
abuse of discretion. But see State v. Sultan, 142 N. C. 569, 54 S. E. 841 (1906),
where a continuance was denied when requested on the ground that trial is sought
in the same term that the indictment is brought. A continuance was asked and
denied on the ground that a Jew had scruples against appearing in court as a
witness on Saturday. Phillips v. Graetz, 23 Am. Dec. 1 (1909). It has been held
that an accomplice in a criminal case who turned state's witness in return for a
promise of immunity from further prosecution has an equitable right to a con-
tinuance pending application to the executive for a pardon. Lowe v. State, 111
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COMMENTS
CONCLUSION
Correlation of the foregoing comments leads to the conclusion that
the manner and method of applying for and supporting an application for
a continuance varies little as between state and federal courts. All statutes
and'rules developed appear to be declaratory of the common law on the
subject. Obviously, where the result of a ruling of a trial court on an
application is the granting of a continuance, any appellate court review
of the ruling would tend to support the trial court's view of the matter.
This follows simply because the reason for the grant is to see that justice
is done to the party requesting the continuance, and few appellate courts
would substitute their judgment in a matter more intimately understood
by a trial judge at the time the request is made. Where the complaint
of the party is to the effect that the trial judge denied justice by denial
of a continuance, the appellate court feels more free to act, providing,
of course, that the all important abuse of discretion can be shown. It
follows that no absolute rules can be laid down as to what will constitute
sufficient grounds for a continuance in all cases. But, both in federal
and state courts, the various rules and formulas for determining the
question are fairly well uniformly understood and applied.
Kenneth McCasky
Student Contributor
Md. 1, 73 At]. 637 (1909). Statutes limiting continuances to be granted non-resi-
dent litigants without limiting residents have been held discriminatory and there-
fore unconstitutional. Jones v. Paxton, 27 F. 2d 364 (1928); State v. Belden,
193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916 (1927). In an action on an insurance policy a request
for continuance on the ground that insurers attorney had not seen the policy was
held properly denied. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Copeland, 184 Ark. 648, 43
S. W. 2d 65 (1931). A denial of a continuance asked by defendant, a newspaper
publisher, on the ground that prejudice existed against the newspaper by a large
class of citizens because of its attitude during a recent political campaign was
held not an abuse of discretion. Courier-Journal Co. v. Sallee, 104 Ky. 335, 47
S. W. 226 (1898). An early federal case held that a continuance will not be
granted because of a report of the recent trial of another cause, depending on the
same facts and principles, has been published in a newspaper. Hurst v. Wickerly,
Fed. Cas. No. 6940, 1 Wash. C. C. 276 (1805). The foreman of the jury in a
slander case was excused at his own request on account of having uttered similar
words of the plaintiff to those in the suit. The court held that this did not con-
stitute grounds for a continuance. Palmer v. Bogan, I Cheves 52 (S.C.) (1839).
1957]
